
Casting the Nets
People, ambitions and unexpected turns behind mobile phones, digital television and broadband.

An eyewitness to the mobile revolution
The mobile phone revolution was anything but inevitable. Behind GSM were rival technologies, political disagreements, bold decisions and moments when the entire project might have unravelled. Stephen Temple was there, helping to shape the decisions that ultimately connected billions of people. This remarkable first-hand account takes you inside the meetings, confrontations and breakthroughs that changed the world—and reveals how close things came to turning out differently.
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The story in 25 chapters
Over the period 1984-87 the political and strategic direction of GSM was being shaped by France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It was the genesis of the mobile revolution. This is the UK record what happened, how it happened, why it happened and captures the political dynamics within which it all took place.
The GSM 1800 MHz (PCN) element was added a few years later when the UK's DTI was at the leading edge of telecommunications liberalisation and I propelled it to be the first credible entity to set out the vision of the personal mobile phone as a consumer product (‘Phones on the Move’) and put forward the conditions to make it happen.
My election as Chairman of the Technical Assembly of the European Telecommunications standards Institute in 1988 then provided an excellent vantage point as GSM went through its transition from a policy to a new born infant digital mobile industry.
All this left me sitting on a unique account of how GSM came to be the mobile radio equivalent of the cosmic “big bang” and one of Europe's most successful high technology projects.
The GSM element of this account was written within 12 months of the signing of the GSM MoU in Copenhagen in 1987. I had no motive to spin the story in any particular direction or make any particular claims for the success of GSM, which was still a few years away from even getting off the ground. It was simply a means of unwinding on holiday in the French Alps from a tumultuous 18 months by recording to paper what I had just seen and been through. It went straight into a drawer.
Shortly after the launch of GSM (in 1991) would have been an ideal time to publish the story. A close friend and former DTI colleague Jonathan Phillips stayed up one night and read the manuscript. His red ink over the draft said it all. There was no way it would have got official approval for publication without ripping out the very heart of the story – the political dynamics. The story was to remain hidden behind the Official Secrets Act for the next 17 years and gathering dust.
The manuscript was next visited in 2008. Europe's leadership in mobile radio had largely been ceded to other parts of the world. I could see so much that had gone wrong and particularly in respect of the role of European governments and regulators? Could I shine a light on this? The plan was to set out my GSM personal account to show how things had worked successfully in the 80's and compare and contrast with the situation in 2008. This was pre-empted when Lord Carter invited me to sit on the Digital Britain Steering Group in 2008. Rather than drafting my analysis I finished up drafting the infrastructure section for Lord Carter for his Digital Britain report.
It was fun and it simplified what to do with my GSM account. It just needed to be a public record of an important event in Europe's industrial, social and political history. No longer would everyone know how the PC and World Wide Web revolutions had come about (with over 1.3 and 2.5 billion users respectively in 2010) but know almost nothing about how the even more successful mobile revolution had happened (with over 4 billion users in 2010). Finally the curtain would be pulled back on how GSM created a mobile revolution.
Prior to publication I shared a draft version with former colleagues who had worked closely with me on the GSM project at the time. Some colleagues took exception to parts of the account relating to the period 1984-87. I was asked to change some things and delete others. A lively exchange of e-mails followed.
Armin Silberhorne, a former senior German Official I had worked very closely with, best summed up the different viewpoints with his comment that a “political” account will always be seen differently through different eyes. This was very insightful. Officials at the time from France and Germany would view GSM through the eyes of those working in a state monopoly, with a Minister fully in charge – an ordered world in which engineers sought the best technical outcome…with the power to make it happen. Deregulation was still around the corner for them. The UK had already unleashed competition. In a competitive market nobody is in charge. I could see all the market and industrial forces tearing the GSM initiative apart … for the UK…GSM was a huge political challenge. In this respect the UK brought a unique contribution to the GSM initiative since, by the time GSM was launched in 1991, mobile competition had become almost the norm across the European Union.
Those who may only want to read this account of how GSM happened with an eye to seeing if Europe could create another GSM success should fast forward to Chapter 24. Certainly the Global Banking Crisis has shattered the belief that everything is best left to pure market forces and there is much to be re-discovered in this book about the lost art of EU inter-governmental intervention in mobile communications infrastructures that Europe used so successfully to launch GSM in 1991.
Stephen Temple CBE
20th January 2010
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